Suchergebnisse

We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party membership by contributing money to a party, and where a member's influence on the policy taken by her party is proportional to her campaign contribution. The policy consists of informed and uninformed voters : only informed voters join parties, and the party campaign chest, the sum of its received contributions, is used to advertise and reach uninformed voters. Parties compete with each other strategically with respect to policy choice and advertising. We propose a definition of political equilibrium, in which party membership, citizen contributions, and parties' policies are simultaneously determined, for each of four financing institutions, running a gamut between a purely private, unconstrained system, to a public system in which all citizens have equal financial input. We compare the representation and welfare properties of these four institutions. ; Nous proposons une théorie de la politique (deux partis, une seule question) dans laquelle les citoyens deviennent membre d'un parti en le financant et dans laquelle l'influence d'un de ses membres sur la politique proposée par le parti est proportionnelle à sa contribution. L'électorat est constitué de votants informés et non-informés: Seuls les votants informés rejoignent les partis, et le budget de campagne d'un parti, la somme des contributions qu'il reçoit, est utilisé pour communiquer en direction des votants non-informés. Les partis sont en compétition stratégique par rapport à leur choix politique et leur communication. On propose une définition de l'équilibre politique dans laquelle l'appartenance partisane, les contributions et les politiques sont déterminées simultanément, pour quatre modes institutionnels de financement, allant d'un système non contraint purement privé à un système public dans lequel tous les citoyens ont le même impact financier. On compare les qualités des quatre systèmes en termes de représentation et de bien-être.

The formal model of political competition almost ubiquitously employed by students of political economy is one in which political parties play no role. That model, introduced by Anthony Downs (1957) over forty years ago, portrays a competition between candidates, whose sole motivation for engaging in politics is to enjoy the power and perquisites of office holding. Although voters care about policies, the candidates do not; for them, a policy is simply an instrument to be used, opportunistically, as an entry ticket to a prosperous career. Political parties, however, have, throughout the history of democracy, cared about policies, perhaps because they are formed by interest groups of citizens. Therefore the Downsian model cannot be viewed as an historically accurate model of party competition.

A model of market socialism is proposed as a type of politico-economic system in which the government can intervene in the economy to control investment so that public-owned firms can be managed to maximize profits, which are then divided equally among all households as a type of social dividend or guaranteed income. Components of market socialism are detailed, & issues of taxation, market allocation of commodities & resources, education, innovations, & development of a just society of self-realized citizens are discussed. It is argued that citizens of a market socialist society, unlike those of a capitalist society, would not sacrifice social welfare, world peace, & the global environment to increase corporate profits. In Comment, Joanne Barkan & David Belkin detail flaws in each of five features of the model: government control over investment; public ownership of the means of production; workers' control over management; private ownership; & politics in the absence of a capitalist class. It is concluded that Roemer's initial assumptions are too broad & universal to be applied, & set up a rigid bureaucratic structure with doubtful socialist content. In Reply, Roemer defends each feature of his model, refutes critical arguments, & asserts that his proposed blueprint, a synthesis of the work of several economists, offers a means to improve the quality of life for society. 2 References. M. Malas

Frontmatter -- Preface -- Contents -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Origin of Exploitation -- 3. Feudalism and Capitalism -- 4. Exploitation and Profits -- 5. The Morality of Exploitation -- 6. The Emergence of Class -- 7. Exploitation without a Labor Market -- 8. Historical Materialism -- 9. Evolving Forms of Exploitation -- 10. Public Ownership of the Means of Production -- 11. Epilogue -- Appendix: Statements and Proofs of Theorems -- Bibliographical Notes -- References -- Index

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Circumstances, Types, and Autonomous Choice -- 3 Justifying the Proposal -- 4 A Formal Definition of Equality of Opportunity -- 5 Incentive Properties of the EOp Mechanism -- 6 Equality of Opportunity with Production -- 7 Equality of Opportunity for Welfare -- 8 Equality of Opportunity for Health -- 9 Education and Advantage -- 10 Equal-Opportunity Unemployment Insurance -- 11 The EOp Distribution of Educational Finance in the United States -- 12 The Scope and Extent of Equal Opportunity -- 13 To What Extent Should We Equalize Opportunities -- 14 Affirmative Action -- 15 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Index

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1. Political Competition over a Single Issue: The Case of Certainty -- 2. Modeling Party Uncertainty -- 3. Unidimensional Policy Spaces with Uncertainty -- 4. Applications of the Wittman Model -- 5. Endogenous Parties: The Unidimensional Case -- 6. Political Competition over Several Issues: The Case of Certainty -- 7. Multidimensional Issue Spaces and Uncertainty: The Downs Model -- 8. Party Factions and Nash Equilibrium -- 9. The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Taxation -- 10.Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the Rich in Democracies -- 11. Distributive Class Politics and the Political Geography of Interwar Europe -- 12. A Three-Class Model of American Politics -- 13. Endogenous Parties with Multidimensional Competition -- 14. Toward a Model of Coalition Government -- Mathematical Appendix -- References -- Index

Intro -- Contents -- 1. Introduction -- The Private Property System -- Exploitation -- Classes -- Historical Materialism -- Capitalism and Freedom -- Method -- A Preview -- 2. The Origin of Exploitation -- An Egalitarian Distribution of Capital -- The Technical Definition of Exploitation -- Unequal Ownership of the Capital Stock -- The Causes of Exploitation -- The Industrial Reserve Army -- Concluding Comments -- 3. Feudalism and Capitalism -- A Brief Account of Feudalism -- A Difference between Capitalism and Feudalism -- 4. Exploitation and Profits -- Embodied Labor and Exploitation -- Prices and the Profit Rate -- The Relationship between Exploitation and Profits -- An Economy with Many Produced Goods -- The Social Division of Labor and the Perception of Exploitation -- The Labor Theory of Value -- 5. The Morality of Exploitation -- Exploitation as the Source of Profits -- The Initial Distribution -- Justification of Unequal Distribution -- 6. The Emergence of Class -- A Definition of Equilibrium for a Corn Model with Assets -- Class Formation -- Class and Wealth -- Class and Exploitation -- The Significance of Class -- Exploitation Deemphasized -- 7. Exploitation without a Labor Market -- The Corn Economy with a Capital Market -- Capital Market Island: The Five-Class Model -- Capital Markets and Workers' Cooperatives -- Exploitation without Labor or Capital Markets -- International Capitalism: Imperialism and Labor Migration -- Domination versus Exploitation versus Property Relations -- 8. Historical Materialism -- Economic Structure, Productive Forces, and Superstructure -- The Role of Class Struggle -- The Logic of the Theory -- Challenges from Economic History -- Evolving Property Relations -- 9. Evolving Forms of Exploitation -- Historical Materialism and Private Property -- The Failure of Surplus Value as a Measure of Exploitation.

Many believe that equality of opportunity will be achieved when the prospects of children no longer depend upon the wealth and education of their parents. The institution through which the link between child and parental prospects may be weakened is public education. Many also believe that democracy is the political institution that will bring about justice. This study, first published in 2006, asks whether democracy, modeled as competition between political parties that represent different interests in the polity, will result in educational funding policies that will, at least eventually, produce citizens who have equal capacities (human capital), thus breaking the link between family background and child prospects. In other words, will democracy engender, through the educational finance policies it produces, a state of equal opportunity in the long run?